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Recent Developments in Insider Trading Laws 
and Problems of Enforcement in Great Britain 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In November 1986, two insider trading scandals stunned the financial world. 
The first, in the United States, involved charges by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) against Dennis Levine and Ivan Boesky.! A similar scandal 
shocked the financial services industry in Great Britain when Geoffrey Collier, 
director of the securities group at the merchant bank and brokerage house of 
Morgan Grenfell, was arrested on charges of violating Great Britain's laws 
against insider trading. 2 The arrest of Collier resulted in an outcry from the 
British public and the financial services industry for more effective enforcement 
of the laws on insider trading.' In response, the government quickly imple-
mented new laws strengthening the investigative powers of the government 
regarding the detection of insider trading law violations. 4 
Insider trading is the buying and selling of securities on the basis of privileged 
information not available to the public and which, if known generally, would 
be likely to materially affect the price of those securities.5 Commentators have 
criticized insider trading as unethical and injurious to investor confidence in 
the fairness of securities markets. 6 In Great Britain, a combination of statutory 
oversight and industry self-regulation of the financial services industry provides 
! 8 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1669 (Nov. 21, 1986). 
2 "Bang Goes a Scandal," The Sunday Times (London), Nov. 16, 1986, at 73, col. I. Collier, director 
of the securities group at Morgan Grenfell, was charged with making a profit of $22,000 by trading 
on the basis of inside information. "The Case for an S.E.C. in Britain," N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1986, at 
D4, col. I. 
3 "U.K. Shocker: Insiders Lose Right to Remain Silent," Barron's, Nov. 24, 1986, at 70, col. 2. 
4 Wall SI. J., Nov. 17, 1986, at 29, col. I. 
5 CHARLESWORTH & CAIN, COMPANY LAW 442 (1983). Insider trading can occur in a variety of ways: 
a company officer or employee may buy or sell his or her company's stock, or those of another 
company with whom his or her company has dealings, on the basis of information not generally 
available to the public, or such a person can divulge such information to another (a "tippee") who 
trades in the company's shares. /d. In addition, insider trading can occur when a government employee, 
who comes into contact with privileged information concerning companies in the course of his or her 
duties, trades shares on the basis of such information, or counsels others to do so. Id. 
6 B. RIDER, INSIDER TRADING 2-5 (1983) [hereinafter B. RIDER I]. Some authors use economic theory 
to argue that there are certain benefits to the corporation, the stockholders, the investors, and the 
market derived from insider trading. See H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966); 
Carlton and Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1983); King and Roell, 
Insider Trading, 6 ECON. POL. 165 (1988). 
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a framework for regulating insider trading. 7 In recent years, as the role of the 
government in regulating the industry has grown, the nature of this arrange-
ment has gradually evolved.8 The most recent and far-reaching changes came 
with the implementation of the Financial Services Act 1986 (1986 Act).9 This 
Act delegates governmental regulatory powers to a private agency, the Securities 
and Investment Board (SIB), to regulate the entire investment industry through 
a network of authorized self-regulating institutions and other semi-public bod-
ies.11) 
7 B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at Ill. 
8 B. RIDER, D. CHAIKIN AND C. ABRAMS, GUIDE TO THE FINANCIAL SERVICES ACT 1986 ~~ 210,213. 
9 Financial Services Act, 1986, ch. 60, §§ 173-78. Barnard, The United Kingdom Financial Services Act 
1986: A New Regulatory Framework, 21 INT'L LAW. 343 (J 987). The provisions on insider trading became 
effective in November, 1986 following the arrest of Collier. The Times (London), Nov. 15, 1986, at 
1, col. 1. 
10 The Financial Services Act 1986 provides a revised statutory framework for regulating and 
authorizing the conduct of the investment business. B. RIDER, D. CHAIKIN AND C. ABRAMS, supra note 
8, at ~ 301. The Act authorizes the Secretary of State for Trade to delegate his authority over the 
financial services industry to a private sector body, the Securities.and Investment Board (SIB). [d. at 
~ 302. The SIB may authorize investment businesses which the Act requires as a condition of doing 
business. [d. at 11 304. In 1987 and 1988, the SIB issued an initial set of Rules and Regulations which 
are currently undergoing comment and revision. British investors' bill oj rights, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 
30, 1988, at 80. The Rules and Regulations govern the authorization of industry members, as well as 
the conduct of business, including disclosure of material information, advertising, security of infor-
mation within investment houses, record keeping, and capitalization. B. RIDER, D. CHAIKIN AND 
C. ABRAMS, supra note 8, at 11 303. The SIB can also discipline authorized persons for breaches of its 
rules. [d. The available sanctions include prohibiting the conduct of certain types of investment business 
or suspending the authorized person temporarily or permanently from carrying on investment business 
altogether. [d. at ~~ 1201-11. 
The Act also established a number of Self-Regulating Organizations (SROs). [d. at 11 301. The SIB 
will recognize and regulate the SROs, which are themselves empowered to authorize investment 
businesses and are expected to do most of this work. !d. at 11~ 306, 308. The SROs will regulate the 
investment businesses within their purview and will have rules quite similar to those of the SIB. [d. at 
~ 308. The SROs which are expected to receive SIB authorization are The Securities Association 
(which includes the Stock Exchange), organizations of financial advisers and brokers, investment 
managers, futures brokers, and life insurance companies. !d. at 11 307. The Act also provides for 
Recognized Investment Exchanges (RIEs), which the SIB will authorize if it is satisfied that the 
exchange is a fair and efficient market and is adequately capitalized. [d. at 11 313. The Stock Exchange 
is part of such an RIE. [d. The SIB is not itself directly involved in the enforcement of laws against 
insider trading; the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) will continue that function. Nor will it 
supplant the Stock Exchange in the self-regulatory aspects of deterring insider trading. The Conduct 
of Business Rules of the SIB do address insider trading, calling on member firms to use their "best 
endeavours" to ensure that no officers or employees take any action in violation of the 1985 Act. 
SECURITIES AND INVESTMENT BOARD, RULES AND REGULATIONS, Conduct of Business Rules, Rule 5.21 
(J 987). This rule, while indirect, finds effect through the various sanctions the SIB may impose on 
violators of its rules. It also leaves violators open to possible restitution orders under § 61 of the 1986 
Act or civil suit under § 62. See infra notes 267-80 and accompanying text. There appears to be a 
good deal of overlap and conflicting authority created under the Act, and it will become clear only 
with time the extent to which the entire apparatus functions smoothly. [d. 
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One function which the government will retain, however, is the enforcement 
of laws against insider trading. The British government did not regulate insider 
trading until 1980; before that time the financial services industry monitored 
such activity. II In 1980, the Companies Act 1980 12 made insider trading a 
criminal offense for the first time. The Company Securities (Insider Dealing) 
Act 1985 (1985 Act)13 re-enacted the insider trading provisions of the Compa-
nies Act 1980. The Financial Services Act 1986 amended the 1985 Act and also 
created new powers to investigate and enforce insider trading laws. '4 
Under the 1986 Act, the government, through the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI), retains the power to investigate suspected insider trading law 
violations and enforce the laws against insiders. IS In addition, the self-regulatory 
organizations, most notably the International Stock Exchange of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland (Stock Exchange) and the Panel on Take-overs and 
Mergers (Panel), continue to play an important, if non-statutory, role in the 
detection and punishment of insider trading violations. 16 Since 1980 the record 
of enforcement h,..s been uneven, and it is still unclear what level of success the 
government will enjoy in enforcement, given its new powers of investigation 
and the enhanced surveillance capabilities of the Stock Exchange. '7 
This Comment will first examine the continuing structure of self-regulation 
of insider trading in the British financial services industry, popularly referred 
to as "the City,"'8 and the role self-regulation plays in the evolving statutory 
framework. '9 Next, the Comment will briefly survey the development of insider 
trading as a criminal offense in Great Britain.20 The Comment will then examine 
the record of enforcement since 1980, looking specifically at the problems of 
effective detection, investigation, and enforcement.21 More specifically, this sec-
tion will look at the commitment of the government and the courts to vigorous 
enforcement, problems of statutory interpretation, coordination between the 
Stock Exchange and the Department of Trade and Industry on detection and 
investigation, and the lack of civil remedies which can serve as a deterrent to 
liB. RIDER I, supra note 6, at Ill. 
" Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, §§ 68-74. 
J3 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985, ch. 8. 
14 Financial Services Act 1986, supra note 9, at §§ 177-78. 
IS Id. 
J6 B. RIDER, D. CHAIKIN AND C. ABRAMS, supra note 8, at ~ 702. 
17 See infra notes 159-83 and accompanying text. 
J8 The colloquial term for the financial services industry in Great Britain is "the City," so named 
because much of the industry is physically located within the City of London. B. RIDER, D. CHAIKIN 
AND C. ABRAMS, supra note 8, at ~ 115. 
19 See infra notes 23-98 and accompanying text. 
20 See infra notes 99-183 and accompanying text. 
21 See infra notes 184-280 and accom panying text. 
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insider traders. Finally, the Comment concludes with an assessment of current 
detection and enforcement capabilities and makes recommendations concerning 
improved enforcement of insider trading laws in Great Britain.22 
II. SELF-REGULATION IN GREAT BRITAIN 
Prior to 1980, the financial services industry was solely responsible for the 
regulation of insider trading. 23 Traditionally, the City, an intimate and homo-
geneous community, had always governed its own affairs with minimal govern-
ment interference.24 In times of financial scandal or panic, the government 
threatened intervention, but the financial services industry reformed its rules 
and regulations in order to limit the extent of potential government regulation.25 
The primary organizations involved in overseeing insider trading have always 
been the Stock Exchange26 and the Panel on Take-overs and Mergers.27 In 
addition, companies active in the financial services industry maintain in-house 
rules and disciplinary codes relating to stock trading and the handling of sen-
sitive information; these rules apply to the activities of directors, officers, and 
employees. 2H 
This section will first examine the roles of the Stock Exchange and the Panel 
in regulating insider trading. 29 Next, the section will discuss the means of 
investigation available to the Stock Exchange and the Panel and the sanctions 
they can impose.3o Finally, the section will describe the regulatory role of finan-
cial services companies' in-house rules. 31 
22 See infra notes 281-317 and accompanying text. 
2:1 See supra note II and accompanying text. 
"' B. RIDER, D. CHAIKIN AND C. ABRAMS, supra note 8, at 11 114. 
25/d. at 11 203. Government regulation has encroached on the traditional independence of the City, 
beginning as early as the seventeenth century. /d. at 11 J06. 
21i The Stock Exchange is located in London with affiliated provincial exchanges located in several 
other cities. H. BLOOMENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION, 
§ 6.01[3][a] (1987) [hereinafter H. BLOOMENTHAL I]. 
27 B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 8. A number of other professional associations also regulate their 
members with respect to trading in securities. /d. at 111-25. These include the Law Society which 
regulates solicitors, the Institutes of Chartered Accountants, the Association of Certified Accountants, 
the Societ~ of Inv'lstment Analysts, and the Institute of Directors. /d. at 113-25. All of these associations 
maintain codes-some 'quite detailed-which address insider trading and other activities dealing with 
the use of confidential information since the early 1970s. /d. Other associations have made only general 
pronouncements regarding the use of confidential information, or have condemned insider trading 
on principle without promulgating guidelines or sanctions with respect to their membership. [d. at 
115-16. After the passage of the Companies Act 1980, many of the codes were revised to bring them 
into conformance with the law. [d. at III. 
2X B. RIDER AND H. FFRENCH, REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 173 (1979). 
29 See infra notes 32-52 and accompanying text. 
", See infra notes 53-89 and accompanying text. 
:I, See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text. 
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A. Industry Measures and Enforcement 
1. Structure 
a. The Stock Exchange 
269 
The Stock Exchange IS the primary market for the purchase and sale of 
securities in Great Britain. 32 In order for its stock to be traded on the Stock 
Exchange, a company must be listed with the Exchange and agree to abide by 
its listing rules.:l3 The 1986 Act sets forth the minimum requirements for the 
listing rules34 and provides the Stock Exchange with the authority to issue 
specific rules pertaining to the listing and disclosure of material information. 35 
Prior to the 1986 Act, companies had to agree to abide by a formal Listing 
Agreement to qualify for listing on the Stock Exchange. 36 The new listing rules, 
which for the most part are identical to the rules of the old Listing Agreement,:l7 
primarily govern the procedures for disclosure of information likely to have a 
material effect on stock prices; this helps to ensure timely and equal access to 
information affecting investment decisions. 3" 
The Stock Exchange regulates the conduct of its corporate and individual 
members, that is, the companies and brokers who buy and sell stocks on behalf 
of clients.3~1 As a condition of membership, members agree to abide by the 
Exchange's Rules and Regulations, a formal Code of Dealing, and periodically 
issued Notes of Guidance. 10 One of the requirements of the Exchange's rules is 
'" Tm: INTERNATIONAL STOCK EXCHANGE OF GREAT BRITAIN, 1987 ANNUAL REPORT 7-8 (1987) 
[hereinafter STOCK EXCHANGE 1987 ANNUAL REPORT]. Other markets trade the securities of companies 
unable or unwilling to meet the stricter requirements for listing on the Stock Exchange. These other 
markets include the l:nIisted Securities Market, the Over the Counter Market, and the Third Market. 
Id. 
3:1 P. MITCHELl., DIRECTORS' DUTIES AND INSIDER TRADING 138 (1982). 
"., Financial Services Act 1986, supra note 9, at §§ 142-48. 
:F'ld. at § 142. Prior to the implementation of the Financial Services Act 1986, companies desiring 
to be listed on the Stock Exchange agreed to abide by the Exchange's Listing Agreement which 
obligated the compaoy to follow certain rules regarding the timely disclosure of material information 
to the public. B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 11)3. The Listing Agreement also required the company 
seeking listing status to institute in-house rules no less exacting than the Stock Exchange'S Model Code 
f()r Securities Transactions by Directors of Listed Companies. Id. at 169. This agreement was contrac-
tual, not self-regnlating in a strict sense, as the Stock Exchange applied it to outside companies rather 
than to its own members. Page, Self-Regulation: The Constitu.tional Dimension, 49 MOD. L. REV. 141, 146 
(1986). This practice was a means of protecting the Exchange'S members. Id. 
"', STOCK EXCHANGE 1987 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at Hi. 
:17 /d. 
,,> Financial Services Act 1986, .wpra note 9, at § 146. 
"" Page, supra note 19, at 146. 
4i'ld. The Rules and Regulations are supplemented by a Code of Dealing and by periodically issued 
\Jotes of Guidance which are meant to assist members in devising effective in-house codes of conduct. 
B. RIDER I, .Iupra note 6, at 175-76. The Notes of Guidance address issues arising when members find 
themselves in conflict of interest situations. This occurs when they acquire during the course of business 
confidential information from one client which could be used to the profit of another client, to whom 
the member has a duty to maximize returns on investments. fri. 
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that member firms institute measures to prevent leaks of privileged information 
from the corporate finance department to the trading or other departments of 
the firm.41 The Rules and Regulations also prohibit employees of a member 
firm from speculating for personal profit on the basis of confidential informa-
tion in the stock of companies for whom the member firm acts as broker.42 
b. The Panel on Take-overs and Mergers 
Following a period of insider trading abuse in merger activities during the 
late 1950s and 1960s, the Bank of England and several associations of invest-
ment industry firms considered creating an industry watchdog to curb these 
practices.43 This merger activity had led to calls for government regulation of 
the industry and the creation of a British counterpart to the United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission.44 In response to these threats, the finan-
cial services industry created the Panel in 1968 to set standards governing 
commercial conduct during takeovers.45 The Panel, whose chairman is ap-
pointed by the Governor of the Bank of England, consists of representatives of 
the Council of the Stock Exchange46 as well as representatives of other financial, 
banking, brokerage, and insurance industry professional associations.47 The 
Panel issues, interprets, and enforces the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers 
(City Code).4" The City Code applies to employees of companies which are 
members of the industry associations comprising the Panel, when those com-
panies are engaged in takeover and merger activities. 49 
When a takeover or merger offer is underway, the City Code prohibits persons 
other than the offeror, who have "confidential price-sensitive information" re-
lating to the offer, from dealing in the stock or stocks involved. 50 The City Code 
also prohibits anyone possessing such confidential information from disclosing 
it or counseling another to purchase securities on the basis of the information.51 
41 B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 175. 
" Id. at 176. 
43 H. BLOOMENTHAL I, ,Iupra note 26, at § 6,01[3][bJ, 
44 B, RIDER & H, FFRENCH. supra note 28, at \60, 
" [d, 
4<; The Council of the Stock Exchange is the governing body of the Exchange, STOCK EXCHANGE 
1987 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 2. It is comprised of representatives of member firms, lay 
members not associated with the Exchange or its members, and members ex officio, such as the 
Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Stock Exchange. [d, 
47 CITY CODE ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS, at para, I (a) (Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, London, 
\985) [hereinafter CITY CODE], 
48 A, JOHNSON, CITY CODE ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS \58-59 (\980), 
49 CITY CODE, supra note 47, at 2, 
50 Id. at Rule 4, \ (a), 
51 [d, at Rule 4, \ (b), 
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Hence, the City Code addresses the problems of insider trading, but only applies 
to such activities which occur during takeover and merger activities,'" 
2. Enforcement: Investigations and Sanctions 
a. Investigations 
The Stock Exchange conducts investigations of suspicious stock price move-
ments to determine whether anyone has breached the statutory law, the listing 
rules, or Stock Exchange Rules and Regulations. 53 While most price movements 
are attributable to normal market forces, a small number merit further inquiry. 54 
If a violation is suspected, the Council of the Stock Exchange sets up an ad hoc 
committee comprised of a Council member and two Exchange members to 
conduct a preliminary investigation. 55 As part of the investigation, the committee 
requests information from brokers and other Stock Exchange members to 
reconstruct the events of the transaction under inquiry and to determine who 
played what role. 56 The Stock Exchange's Rules and Regulations require its 
members to assist the committee and give the Stock Exchange the power to 
discipline members who fail to comply with requests for information.57 On 
several occasions, the Stock Exchange has suspended and even expelled mem-
bers for noncompliance with investigators' requests. 58 The Stock Exchange's 
inability to compel nonmembers to provide information has hindered committee 
investigations."" This problem becomes evident when company insiders or other 
insider traders use foreign, nonmember nominees to trade stocks on their 
behalf.lio 
Prior to 1980, the Stock Exchange had limited success in detecting and 
investigating suspected cases of insider trading. hI This was in part due to its 
poor detection capabilities and limited investigatory resources.62 The lack of any 
authority to compel the disclosure of information to investigators was also an 
obstacle.6" In addition, the Stock Exchange was reluctant to publicize the names 
of insider traders, a practice which might have had significant deterrent effect. 
')2 See .Hljna notes 43-4H and acco111panying text. 
53 B. RIlU.R I, sUjJra note 6, at 150. 
" !d. 
"c'ld. 
"" Iii. 
"Ill. at IS!. 
'" Id. 
5~1 D. Hawes, T. Lee, and M.-C. Robert, In,lirirr Trading Law Developmnlts: An International Analy~i5, 14 
l.AW. & POL'y INT'L Bus. 335, 378-79 (1985) [hereinafter Hawes]. 
W B. RIDER I, ",pm note 6. at IS!. 
(il B. RID'" AND H. FFRENCII, ,Iupra note 28. at 164-65. 
v2/d. 
6:lld, 
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The Stock Exchange was reluctant to do this hecause it had no immunity against 
defamation actions brought by those named."4 Hence, there were relatively few 
investigations of suspected insider traders prior to 1980 and even fewer publi-
cized inquiries,1i5 Since insider trading became a crime in 1980, the Stock Ex-
change has agreed to refer to the Department of Trade and Industry the results 
of investigations indicating a potential violation of the law."G 
The Panel on Take-overs and Mergers relies primarily on the Stock Exchange 
to inquire into suspected breaches of the City Code,67 The Panel relies on the 
Stock Exchange's greater surveillance and investigatory resources,6R The Stock 
Exchange turns over to the Panel the results of inquiries conducted at the 
request of the Panel, as well as the results of its own inquiries if a breach of the 
City Code has occurred,"'} The Panel may also conduct its own inquiries into 
suspected breaches of the City Code. 70 The Panel Executive, which is headed 
by the Director General, can interview the parties involved in the takeover 
activity in question." The Panel may interview brokers, jobbers, investment 
bankers and advisors, company officials, and members of the public. 72 
The Panel, like the Stock Exchange, is hampered by its lack of power to 
compel, subject to its sanctions, all potential witnesses to provide information. 73 
Since 1980, the Panel has referred suspected violations of the statute to the 
Department of Trade and Industry for further investigation. 74 The Panel has, 
however, retained the prohibition against insider trading in the versions of the 
City Code published since 1980.7' The Panel believes that the City Code will 
continue to be an effective means of uncovering insider trading violations which 
';1 !d. 
6', [d. 
66 B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 150. The nature of the agreement between the Stock Exchange and 
the DTI is unclear; it may be a formal agreement setting forth the circumstances under which the 
Stock Exchange will refer investigations to the DTI, or it may be a less formal arrangement leaving 
the Stock Exchange a certain amount of discretion. Whatever its nature, the Stock Exchange has a 
strong interest in curbing insider trading, and it is not likely to shield members froln the authorities, 
as the potential cost to its reputation and continued autonomy would be great. See Goodison, HA Better 
Chance Now of Prosecuting the Crooks," The Times (London), Feb. 24, 1987, at 23, col. 2. See also 
FINANCIAL SERVICES IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, CMND. 9432, at para. 15.15 (1985) [hereinafter FINAN-
CIAL SERVIU:S WHITE PAPER] . 
.,7 B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 222. 
'i< [d. 
"'I A. JOHNSON, I11pra note 48, at 160. 
70 CITY CODE, supra note 47, at para. 6. 
71 [d. 
" A. JOHNSON, supra note 48, at 160. 
7:\ [d. at 162. The City Code's investigatory proceedings are informal, with no rules or evidence or 
requirement of representation by counsel. CITY CODE, supra note 47, at para. 7. The Panel has no 
power to subpoena witnesses or documents, but can inlpose its sanctions on witnesses it feels are 
uncooperative. [d. 
71 Lee, The New Take-over Code-A Clarijimtioll, 2 COMPANY LAW. 99, 102 (1981). 
75 CITY CODE, supra note 47, at Rule 4. 
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the statutory law does not cover. 76 The practical effect of this prohibition is that 
the Panel can continue to impose its disciplinary measures, including forcing 
violators of its rules to pay over their profits from insider trading to charity.77 
In 1987, following criticism of the Panel's inability to detect breaches of the 
City Code, the DTI announced measures designed to strengthen the Panel. 78 
These included granting the Stock Exchange, the SIB, and other self-regulatory 
organizations the authority to provide the Panel with confidential information 
on stock transactions directly, rather than waiting until the Stock Exchange 
conducted an investigation and referred the results to the Panel.79 Moreover, 
the DTI announced that the SIB and the Stock Exchange will promulgate new 
rules requiring their members to cooperate with Panel inquiries; these organi-
zations will then be able to impose their own sanctions for violations of the City 
Code.80 
b. Sanctions 
The Stock Exchange can impose sanctions for breaches of its listing rules. It 
can suspend trading in a company's securities and, in extreme cases, remove 
the offending company's stock from listing on the Exchange.8! Suspension from 
trading is, however, used more as a means of maintaining orderly markets than 
as a sanction for insider trading activity.82 The Stock Exchange uses deli sting as 
punishment for the most severe violations by a company, rather than as pun-
ishment because a company's employee has engaged in insider trading.83 The 
Stock Exchange can also suspend or expel member firms or individual members 
for breaches of its Rules. 84 While the Stock Exchange has referred the results 
of its insider trading inquiries to the Department of Trade and Industry since 
1980, it has retained its own sanctions and can impose them against members 
or listed companies even if there is no criminal violation.85 
The Panel on Take-overs and Mergers has available its own set of sanctions, 
but these apply only within the narrow context of takeover and merger activi-
ties. 86 The Panel can censure an offender publicly and privately, express public 
76 Lee, supra note 74, at 102. 
77 /d. 
7S Carey, Shoring up the Takeover Panel, 137 NEW. L.J. 511 (1987). 
79Id. 
'Old. 
BI B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 174. 
'2Id. 
" /d. 
84 Id. at 178-79. In 1987 the Stock Exchange expelled Geoffrey Collier from membership following 
his conviction for insider trading. The Times (London), Oct. 12, 1987, at 25, col. 2. The Stock Exchange 
stated that Collier's actions had brought the Exchange into "disrepute." Id. 
,; B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 178. 
86 A. JOHNSON, supra note 48, at 160-61. 
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opinions about the fitness of named offenders for directorship of companies, 
and compel the individual offender to pay profits from insider trading activities 
to charity.87 After the passage of the Companies Act 1980, the Panel, like the 
Stock Exchange, agreed to refer suspected criminal violations to the Department 
of Trade and Industry.88 The Panel will, however, retain authority to investigate 
and sanction violators of the City Code.89 
B. In-House Rules of Financial Services Companies 
By the 1970s, most companies in the financial services industry had developed 
and promulgated in-house codes which generally governed confidentiality and 
employee stock trading and which specifically prohibited insider trading. gO The 
first companies to institute such codes considered them primarily public rela-
tions exercises rather than serious, effective means of self-regulation.91 Also 
dming this period, the Stock Exchange's Listing Agreement contained no spe-
cific prohibitions against insider trading.92 In 1977, to remedy this omission and 
bolster investor confidence, the Stock Exchange issued a Model Code for Se-
curities Transactions by Directors of Listed Companies (Model Code).93 As a 
requirement of listing, companies had to institute internal codes no less strict 
than the Model Code.94 Since 1977, listed companies have strengthened their 
internal codes in an effort to maintain public confidence in the markets and 
avoid increased governmental intervention. 95 
The Model Code prohibits directors from dealing in their own company's 
securities on the basis of inside information not available to the public generally, 
or under other circumstances in which the disclosure of material information 
is pending.96 The Model Code also requires directors to ensure that employees 
of the company, as well as directors and employees of subsidiary companies, 
adhere to the Model Code's principles.97 The companies' sanctions range from 
a reprimand to dismissal, and are a more immediate and effective deterrent 
87 B. RIDER AND H. FFRENCH, supra note 28, at 165. 
88 Lee, supra note 74, at 102. 
89 [d. 
9D B. RIDER 1, supra note 6, at 127. 
91 [d. 
92 B. RIDER AND H. FFRENCH, supra note 28, at 167. 
93 MODEL CODE FOR SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS BY DIRECTORS OF LISTED COMPANIES. (The Interna-
tional Stock Exchange of Great Britain, 1977) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. See generally P. MITCHELL, 
DIRECTORS' DUTIES, supra note 33, at 141. 
94 B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 127-28. 
95 [d. See supra note 25. 
% MODEL CODE, supra note 93. 
97 [d. 
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than criminal penalties; criminal penalties are far less certain to be imposed 
due to the time and expense involved in DTI investigations.9H 
III. STATUTORY PROHIBITIONS AGAINST INSIDER TRADING 
A. Early Attempts to Prohibit Insider Trading 
The financial services industry has regulated its members for decades. The 
government supports the role of self-regulation99 and has encouraged day-to-
day oversight by existing professional and industry organizations. lOo The gov-
ernment recognizes that self-regulation contributes to the "maintenance of high 
standards as a matter of integrity and principle, not because they are imposed 
from outside."101 The role of government regulation in the financial services 
sector has, however, increased steadily over timeYl2 
On various occasions prior to 1980, segments of the financial community and 
the government called for statutory prohibitions on insider trading. A succession 
of governments responded with several abortive attempts to enact legislation. 109 
In 1962, a study committee of the Board of Trade (the predecessor agency of 
the Department of Trade and Industry)104 submitted a report calling for direc-
tors to avoid trading their companies' shares on the basis of privileged infor-
mation. lo5 This committee recommended revision of existing company law to 
protect investors injured by insider trading involving company directors. 106 
Parliament, however, failed to enact the committee's recommendation in the 
Companies Bill 1967.107 In 1973 the Conservative government proposed a Com-
panies Bill that included provisions outlawing insider trading; this bill failed 
'" B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 127. 
'9 FINANCIAL SERVICES WHITE PAPER, supra note 66, at para. 3.2. 
IOU [d. at para. 2.16. 
101 [d. at para. 3.2. 
102 See B. RIDER, D. CHAIKIN AND C. ABRAMS, supra note 8, at ~~ 105-13. 
11)3 Hawes, supra note 59, at 337-38. As early as 1945, the Committee on Company Law Amendment, 
known as the Cohen Committee, concluded that it was improper for company directors to act on the 
basis of information not available to shareholders. The Cohen Committee concluded that it was 
similarly improper for directors to divulge such infdrmation to outsiders. REPORT OF THf' COMMITTEE 
ON COMPANY LAW AMENDMENT, CMND. 6659 at para. 86 (1945). The Committee recommended man-
datory disclosure of directors' stock holdings as a means of curbing tbe practice of insider trading. !d. 
at SO. Parliament enacted this recommendation as part of the Companies Act 1948 but did not explicitly 
prohibit insider trading. B. RIDER ANn H. FFRENCH, supra note 28, at 191. 
104 REPORT OF THE COMPANY LAW COMMITTEE, CMND. 1749 (1962), also known as the .JenkIns 
Committee. 
105 [d. at para. 88. 
J06 !d. at para. 89. 
107 B. RIDER AND H. hRENCH, supra note 28, at 192. 
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when the government resigned in 1974.108 During consideration of the bill, the 
opposition Labour Party also favored making insider trading a criminal of-
fense. 109 In addition, the Labour Party sharply criticized the record of the self-
regulatory bodies. I 10 The Labour opposition proposed a statutory body modeled 
on the Securities and Exchange Commission, which was an unpopular idea in 
the City. II I In 1977 the Labour Government proposed making insider trading 
a criminal offense in a Companies Bill.112 The government noted the obstacles 
to detection and enforcement and stated that it offered the proposed legislation 
primarily for its deterrent effect. 113 While the Stock Exchange and the Panel 
voiced reservations about the bill's effect on self-regulation, they supported its 
passage. 114 The bill failed, however, when the Labour government resigned in 
1979.115 
B. Statutory Prohibitions Against Insider Trading 
In 1980 Parliament enacted the Companies Act 1980116 which, for the first 
time, made insider trading a statutory violation.ll7 In 1985, Parliament consol-
idated the insider trading provisions of the Companies Act 1980 with relevant 
provisions of other company legislation l18 in enacting the Company Securities 
(Insider Dealing) Act 1985. 119 The Financial Services Act 1986 amended the 
1985 Act and added provisions enhancing the investigatory powers of govern-
ment inspectors. 120 
1. Prohibitions 
Under the 1985 Act, an individual who is or during the previous six months 
has been knowingly connected with a company may not trade in that company's 
w' Hawes, supra note 59, at 337-38. In 1973 the Panel and the Stock Exchange issued a joint 
statement admitting that they lacked the authority to conduct fully effective investigations into insider 
trading, and they urged the government to enact criminal sanctions to supplement their own role and 
to act as a deterrent. Hull, Insider Trading: An End to the Debate in Britain?, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 85, 90 
(1979). 
w" Hull, supra note 108, at 92. 
110 Id. 
III !d. 
m THE CONDUCT OF COMPANY DIRECTORS, CMND. 7037 at para. I (1977). 
11'IId. at para. 23. 
114 B. RIDER AND H. FFRENCH, supra note 28, at 454-55. 
II', !d. at 338. 
I III Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22. 
117 !d. at §§ 68-73. When the Conservative Government first introduced the bill which became the 
Companies Act 1980 it did not contain provisions prohibiting insider trading despite pressure from 
the opposition Labour Party to include such a ban. B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 13. The government 
later relented and amended the bill to include provisions on insider trading. !d. 
II' Companies Act, 1948, ch. 38, at § 455; Companies Act, 1981, ch. 62, at § 112, Sched. 3. 
II'! Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985, supra note 13. 
1'" Financial Services Act, 1986, supra note 9, at §§ 173-78. 
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stock if in possession of inside information. 121 The 1985 Act defines inside 
information as information that (1) an individual possesses through his or her 
connection with the company, (2) he or she would reasonably be expected to 
know but not to disclose, and (3) he or she knows to be "unpublished price-
sensitive information."122 A knowing connection with a company arises from 
having either a position as a director, officer, or employee of such a company, 
or a professional relationship with the company such as a lawyer, auditor, or 
broker.I23 The Act also prohibits such an individual from trading in the secu-
rities of any other company if the information relates to either an actual or 
contemplated transaction (such as a takeover) between the individual's company 
and the other company.I24 This prohibition operates solely on the basis of 
possession of the proscribed type of information. The prohibition does not take 
into account the individual's motive for trading, nor does it require that the 
individual actually used the information in trading the securities; it is sufficient 
merely that he or she was in possession of unpublished price-sensitive in for-
mation. I25 
The 1985 Act also prohibits secondary, or tippee, insider trading. A person 
who knowingly acquires information from an insider whom he or she knows 
would not normally disclose such information by virtue of the insider's position 
may not trade the stock of the insider's company.I26 Moreover, the tippee may 
not trade in the stock of any other company with which the insider's company 
is involved in an actual or potential transaction. 127 Unlike the case of insider 
trading by a primary insider, it is not necessary that the information a tippee 
uses be unpublished price-sensitive information, but only that it was knowingly 
obtained from an insider as defined under the 1985 Act. I28 
It is also an offense to act as a "tipper," that is, to divulge confidential 
information to a person whom the tipper knows or has reason to believe will 
use the information in trading securities. 129 In addition, insiders may not "coun-
sel or procure" any other person to trade stock based on the insider's possession 
121 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, supra note 13, at § I. 
mid. at § I (I). The Act does not precisely define the meaning of "unpublished price sensitive 
information," but emphasizes that it relates to specific matters concerning the company that would, if 
generally known to investors, be likely to materially affect the price of the company's stock. Company 
Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, supra note 13, at § 10. The language of the 1985 Act implies 
that an insider need not use inside information in his or her decision to trade a particular stock; mere 
possession of the information at the time of the trade is sufficient to constitute an offense. ld. at § I. 
123 P. MITCHELL, supra note 33, at 153-54. 
124 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, supra note 13, at § 1(2). 
125 B. RIDER, D. CHAIKIN AND C. ABRAMS, supra note 8, at ~ 704. 
126 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, supra note 13, at § 1(3)-(4). 
127 !d. at § 1(6). 
1" B. RIDER, D. CHAIKIN AND C. ABRAMS, s1lpm note 8, at ~ 715. 
129 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, supra note 13, at § 1(7). 
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of privileged information, if the insider knows or has reason to believe that the 
person so counseled or procured would trade in the stock of the company.130 
This provision appears quite similar to the prohibition on tipping, but is de-
signed to cover the gray area of subtle references and hints that fall short of 
an outright disclosure to a tippee. '31 
In the takeover context, an individual planning a takeover offer may buy the 
stock of the target company in order to effect the takeover, but may not trade 
in the stock in any other capacity in the knowledge that the offer is unpublished 
price-sensitive information. 132 In addition, an individual who knowingly learns 
of such an offer from the one making the offer may not trade in the stock of 
the target company if he or she also knows the fact of the offer to be unpublished 
price-sensitive information. '33 The practical effect of these takeover related 
provisions is to bring the insider trading provisions of the City Code within the 
1985 Act's prohibitions. '34 
The prohibitions against insider trading in the 1985 Act also apply to Crown 
servants,135 (that is, employees of government agencies) in possession of unpub-
lished price-sensitive information. '36 Such individuals may not trade securities 
on the basis of such information on their own behalf, nor may they advise or 
hire others to do SO.137 In addition, they may not communicate privileged 
information to other persons they reasonably believe may use it in trading 
securities. 138 The 1986 Act extends these prohibitions to public servants gen-
erally.'39 This category is broader than that of Crown servants, and includes 
employees of other public bodies, employees of agencies which are delegated 
130Id. at § 1(8). 
131 B. RIDER, D. CHAIKIN AND C. ABRAMS, supra note 8, at ~ 718. 
132 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 198.1), supra note 13, at § 1(5). 
133Id. at § 1(6). 
134 GORE-BROWNE ON COMPANIES § 12.25 (1986). 
m Crown servants are individuals who hold office under, or are employed by, the Crown. This 
includes government ministries and agencies but not employees of nationalized industries or local 
authorities, who are public but not Crown servants. OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW 324 (1980). 
l'l6 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, supra note 13, at § 2. 
1'17 Id. at § 2(1 )-(2). 
1:18 Id. at § 2(3). Beginning in 1987 the DTI conducted a year-long investigation into allegations that 
civil servants of the Office of Fair Trading, which reviews merger applications, had disclosed price-
sensitive information to outsiders, who traded stock on the basis of the information. The Times 
(London), Mar. 5, 1988, at 25, col. 2. In 1988 the government charged Sarah Coren, a civil servant 
with the Office of Fair Trading, with violating §§ 1-2 of the 1985 Act, which prevent Crown servants 
from disclosing inside information to anyone they know or have reason to believe will use it to trade 
in stocks. Id. In this case, Coren was charged with passing the information to her brother, Jonathan 
Greenwood, a former stockbroker. The Times (London), Apr. 23, 1988, at 3, col. I. Greenwood was 
himself charged with acting as a tippee. /d. 
139 Financial Services Act 1986, supra note 9, at § 173(1). 
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powers under the 1986 Act, such as the Securities and Investment Board, and 
employees of self-regulating 9rganizations, such as the Stock Exchange. 14D 
The 1985 Act, however, excludes a number of persons from its prohibitions. 
Individuals acting as liquidators,141 receivers,142 or trustees in bankruptcy,143 
who by virtue of their position have access to privileged information, are exempt 
to the extent that they act in "good faith."144 Stock jobbers l45 who obtain infor-
mation that they would reasonably acquire as part of their duties as interme-
diaries on the trading floor are likewise exempt from the Act's prohibitions to 
the extent that they act in good faith. 146 The 1985 Act also prohibits insider 
trading on foreign exchanges to the same extent as on British exchanges. 147 
This is designed to curb the practice by which insiders in Great Britain purchase 
the stock of British companies on overseas exchanges where those companies' 
stock is traded through overseas brokers or nominees. 148 
2. Defenses 
Persons charged with violations of insider trading law can assert several 
defenses. A person can defend a charge that he or she has acted while in 
possession of, but not on the basis of, unpublished price-sensitive information 
by proving that his or her purpose was other than that of making a profit or 
avoiding a loss.149 This defense applies to individuals forced to trade securities 
for the purpose of paying debts or for other long-term motives. 15o These indi-
viduals will have to prove such motives, as they will be presumed to have acted 
on the basis of inside information in their possession. I31 An individual can also 
140Id. at § 173(2). 
141 OXFORD COMPANION TO LAW, supra note 135, at 772. 
142 Jd. at 1040-41. 
143Id. at 1242. 
144 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, supra note 13, at § 3( I )(b). This provision, as well 
as the exception for jobbers in § 3(1 )(c), are the only exemptions which include good faith as an 
element. 
145 A jobber is a dealer who buys and sells stocks on a stock exchange, both for brokers and for his 
own account, but he is not a stock broker who places orders on behalf of clients. WEBSTER'S THIRD 
NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2247 (1981). 
146 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Att 1985, supra note 13, at § 3(1)(c). 
147Id. at § 5. 
148 B. RIDER, D. CHAIKIN AND C. ABRAMS, supra note 8, at ~ 729. This practice is very difficult to 
detect without the ability to obtain evidence from authorities in other countries. See infra note 170. 
149 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, supra note 13, at § 3(J)(a). 
150/d. at § 3(1). 
151/d. Rider, Chaikin and Abrams note that it is difficult to imagine a situation where such a 
transaction would not be for the purpose of either making a profit or avoiding a loss, and hence this 
provision seems to offer little protection. B. RIDER, D. CHAIKIN AND C. ABRAMS, supra note 8, at ~ 720. 
The notes to this particular section of the 1985 Act refer to § 7 of the Act. This section permits trustees 
and personal representatives to deal in stock when otherwise prohibited from doing so if they act 
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defend a charge by establishing that he or she traded securities on the basis of 
inside information in order to facilitate the completion or the carrying out of a 
transaction.l'>2 This defense applies to an employee of a listed company or of a 
brokerage who must carry out orders to buy stock as part of a takeover plan, 
and is in possession of inside information for that purpose alone. 153 
3. Penalties and Enforcement 
The maximum penalties for violation of the 1985 Act are imprisonment for 
up to two years, a fine, or both. 104 If convicted on the basis of a summary trial, 1'5 
the maximum penalty is imprisonment for up to six months, a fine, or both. 156 
The 1985 Act also provides that no transaction made in violation of the Act is 
void or voidable as a result of the violation. ls7 There are no civil remedies under 
the 1985 Act or the 1986 Act. ISH 
Neither the Companies Act 1980 nor the 1985 Act provided for a separate 
office within the Department of Trade and Industry for investigating suspected 
cases of insider trading. Prior to introducing the Companies Act 1980, the 
government rejected suggestions that a specially trained unit of investigators 
was necessary to combat insider trading. I'" The government stated that the bill's 
general enforcement provisions would be sufficient to enforce the new prohib-
itions against insider trading. 160 The 1985 Act similarly included no such en-
harlCed powers. 
'"with propriety"' on the advice of a person who appeared to be '"an appropriate person from whom 
to seek such advice" and did not himself appear prohibited under §§ 1, 2,4, or r, from dealing in the 
"ock. Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, supra note 13, at § 7. 
L;:' Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, sulna note 13, at § 3(2). 
Lil B. RIDER, D. CHAIKIN A!'in C. ABRAMS, supra note 8, at ~ 722. 
I;' Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, supra note 13, at § 8(1 )(a). 
l:-)~) A summary trial is conducted by the judge with no jury and is used when an offense is considered 
not to be '"serious."' Magistrates' Courts Act, 1980, ch. 43. §§ 19-20. If a summary trial is indicated, 
the accused may request a jury trial. 1d. at § 20(2). 
L", Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, .Iutlra note 13, at § R(1)(b). 
L" Id. at § 8(3). 
151' Sa inlra notes 238~80 and accolllpanying text. 
1;" B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 284-85. 
"'"/d. These provisions, contained in §§ 164-75 of the Companies Act 1948, ch. 38 and reenacted 
al §§ 431-53 of the Companies Act 1985, are wide ranging and rarely used by the Department of 
Trade and Industry to investigate potential cases of insider trading due to the expense and time 
involved in conducting an investigation. B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 302-03. DTI investigations were 
traditionally conducted by Queen's Counsel and senior partners of chartered accounting firms. Id. at 
303. These outside inspectors were onlv able to devote part of their time to investigation, which caused 
delays and often resulted in the trail of an investigation going cold. !d. DTI has suggested that it will 
appoint its own inspectors in the future, which may lead to qui('ker and more efficient investigations. 
fr!. 
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In a 1985 Financial Services White Paper,161 the government noted the need 
for vigorous enforcement of securities laws, in order to deter "fraud and mal-
practice."162 The White Paper stated that there was a need to strengthen the 
powers of Department of Trade and Industry investigators in order to improve 
enforcement capabilities. 163 The 1986 Act accordingly gives DTI investigators 
wide powers to obtain information about suspected cases of insider trading. 
The Secretary of State for Trade may, if he or she suspects a violation, appoint 
inspectors to investigate a possible insider trading violation. 164 The inspectors 
have the authority to compel any person to provide information, to produce 
documents considered relevant, to appear and be examined under oath, and to 
"give any assistance that he or she is reasonably able to give."165 Any statement 
made under oath as part of an investigation can later be used in evidence 
against the person making it. 100 
Individuals from whom DTI inspectors request information may be able to 
assert several statutory excuses for declining to comply, but there are several 
limitations on the ability to assert such excuses. An individual may decline to 
disclose information on the grounds of the attorney-client privilege. 167 A bank 
may refuse to disclose information to inspectors if the information relates to 
the affairs of a customer, and the inspectors cannot establish that the customer 
can provide information deemed important to the inquiry.16B In limiting the 
right to refuse compliance with inspectors' requests, the 1986 Act does not allow 
ignorance of a customer's identity to constitute a reasonable excuse. 169 This 
provision is designed to ferret out the principals instigating transactions; many 
past Stock Exchange and government investigations have proved unsuccessful 
because insider traders use a network of foreign nominees and shell corpora-
tions to shield their identityYo In addition, a person refusing to divulge a 
Hil FINANCIAL SERVICES WHITE PAPER. supra note 66. 
162 !d. at para. 3.2. 
163 !d. at para. 14.3. 
164 Financial Services Act 1986, supra note 9, at § 177(1). The nature of the Secretary of State's 
"suspicion" that a violation has occurred is unclear; in most cases the Secretary will presumably act on 
referrals from the Stock Exchange, which monitors trading activity and conducts preliminary inquiries. 
See B. RIDER I. supra note 6, at 285. 
165 Financial Services Act 1986, supra note 9, at § 177(3)-(4). 
166 [d. at § 177(6). 
167 !d. at § 177(7). 
168Id. at § 177(8). It is unclear what standard the DTI inspectors will use in deciding whether 
information a bank can provide about a customer is important to an investigation and therefore subject 
to production. B. RIDER, D. CHAIKIN AND C. ABRAMS, supra note 8, at ~ 731. 
169 [d. at § 178(6). 
170 B. RIDER, D. CHAIKIN AND C. ABRAMS, supra note 8, at ~ 732. In 1986 the Department of Trade 
and Industry, the United States Securities Exchange Commission, and the United States Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission signed a joint Memorandum of Understanding pledging the signatory 
agencies to furnish information requested by their foreign counterparts needed to enforce securities 
and/or commodities trading laws. Memorandum of Understanding on Exchange of Information 
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customer's identity may not use another country's client secrecy laws as an 
excuse, if he or she might have obtained the customer's initial consent to disclose 
the customer's identity to investigators. l7l Brokers and traders have on occasion 
frustrated inspectors by claiming that foreign secrecy laws prohibit them from 
divulging the identity of their customers. 172 Under this particular provision a 
broker will have to show that he or she attempted to obtain approval to disclose 
the client's identity to inspectors before claiming a reasonable excuse for not 
complying with the investigators. I73 Thus, investigations may become more 
efficient, and more successful, as inspectors are able to trace more details of 
transactions. 174 
The 1986 Act imposes penalties for noncompliance with requests for infor-
mation by DTI investigators. J75 Investigators may ask a court to hold a person 
in contempt who refuses to comply with lawful requests for information, or 
refuses to answer investigators' questions if the court finds no reasonable basis 
for the refusal to comply.176 As an alternative, the court may refer the matter 
to the Secretary of State for Trade.177 The Secretary may impose a number of 
sanctions including suspending the right to carryon investment business l78 or 
prohibiting participation in certain categories of transactions or types of busi-
ness. J79 These sanctions may remain in force until the Secretary is satisfied that 
the person is in compliance with the investigators' request. 180 
Between the SEC, CFTC, and the United Kingdom Department of Trade and Industry on Matters 
Relating to Securities and Futures [hereinafter MOU], [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ~ 84,027, at 84,245 (Sept. 23, 1986). The MOU provides that the signatory agencies may request 
information "reasonably relevant" to securing compliance with securities laws and may be used in 
investigations and litigation. ld. at 86,246. This mechanism could be useful to DTI investigators, who 
in the past have had trouble obtaining evidence from abroad. B. RIDER, D. CHAIKIN AND C. ABRAMS, 
sUfrra note 8, at ~ 731. In addition, the MOU could provide a useful model for similar MOUs with 
other nations, especially those with strict bank secrecy laws, such as Switzerland. This would be of 
great assistance to DTI inspectors. 
171 Financial Services Act 1986, supra note 9, at § 1 78(6)(b). 
172 B. RIDER, D. CHAIKIN AND C. ABRAMS, supra note 8, at ~ 732. 
m ld. 
174 A judge's ruling in a 1988 insider trading case sharply limited the scope of DTI investigators. 
See The Times (London), Aug. I, 1988, at 19, col. 2. In a case involving Brian Fisher, who was charged 
with buying stock during 1985 as a tippee, a drafting error in the 1986 Act came to light which 
appears to limit the scope of DTI investigations. See infra notes 230-31 and accompanying text. Section 
177 of the 1986 Act sets forth the powers of DTI investigators appointed when the Secretary of the 
DTI suspects a violation of the 1985 Act. By failing to include any mention of the Companies Act 
19S0, which first made insider trading a crime, DTI investigative powers are limited to actions 
occurring after the 1985 Act took effect in mid-1985. The Times (London), Aug. I, 1988, at 19, col. 
2. This development will serve mainly to limit the extent of historical investigation by DTI inspectors 
using the powers granted under the 1986 Act. 
175 Financial Services Act 1986, supra note 9, at § J 78. 
176ld. at § 178(1)-(2). 
177/d. at § 178(2). 
178 ld. at § 178(3)(a)-(c). 
179ld. at § 178(3)(d)-(f). 
180 ld. at § 178(7). 
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If the DTI investigation indicates a violation of the prohibitions on insider 
trading, it refers the matter to the Secretary of State. 181 The Secretary may 
either initiate a prosecution, or refer the matter to the Director of Public 
Prosecutions who may also initiate a criminal prosecution.182 The DTI may be 
reluctant, however, to bring to court any case not having a high likelihood of 
success, as the enforcement record since 1980 reftects. 183 
IV. RECORD OF ENFORCEMENT 
From 1980, the time insider trading became a crime, through 1985, the Stock 
Exchange investigated 251 cases of suspected insider trading, and referred over 
one hundred to the Department of Trade and Industry.184 Through mid-1988, 
the DTI has brought only ten prosecutions, of which seven have been success-
ful. 185 By contrast, the SEC in the United States has brought over one hundred 
successful prosecutions since 1981.186 Critics have charged that the government 
has not devoted sufficient resources to effective enforcement, that the courts 
have not taken the offense seriously enough, and that adequate detection has 
been a problem. 187 In contrast to the United States, the laws in Britain provide 
no express civil remedies to combat or deter insider trading, and the indirect 
means which do exist are not an effective alternative. 188 Thus, the added en-
forcement mechanism of damage suits brought by injured parties is not present. 
This section will examine the level of commitment to enforcement on the part 
of the courts, some of the problems of statutory interpretation, the lack of a 
civil remedy, and the need for more effective surveillance and detection. 
181 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985. supra note 13. at § 8(2). The Director of Public 
Prosecutions is the official responsible for instituting and prosecuting criminal proceedings under the 
authority of the Attorney General. The Prosecution of Offences Act. 1979. ch. 31. sets out the authority 
of the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
182 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985. supra note 13, at § 8(2). 
183 B. RIDER I. supra note 6 at 287. 
184 King and Roell. supra note 6, at 184. 
185 Insider trading in London: The odds move, THE ECONOMIST, Feb, 7, 1987, at 76. The conviction of 
Geoffrey Collier in July. 1987 was the latest under the law prohibiting insider trading. The Times 
(London). July 2.1987. at 1. col. 8. An unsuccessful case brought in 1988 involved Brian Fisher. who 
was charged under the 1985 Act with acting as a tippee but was acquitted at trial. See infra notes 230-
31 and accompanying text. 
186 Insider trading in London: The odds move. THE ECONOMIST. Feb. 7. 1987. at 76. 
187 B. RIDER, D. CHAIKIN AND C. ABRAMS, supra note 8, at ~ 731. See also Tridimas. The Financial 
Services Act and the Detection of Insider Trading. 8 COMPANY LAW. 162. 166 (1987). 
188 See infra notes 238-80 and accompanying text. 
284 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAw REVIEW [Vol. XII, No.1 
A. Government and Judicial Commitment 
1. Successful Prosecutions Under the Companies Act 1980, the Company 
Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, and the Financial Services Act 
1986 
The insider trading prosecutions brought since 1980 reflect, to some extent, 
the lukewarm commitment and slender resources of the DTI devoted to pur-
suing violators of the insider trading laws. These cases have generally involved 
prosecutions of small-scale insider traders who acted on a casual or opportunistic 
basis, rather than those City insiders widely believed to operate sophisticated, 
ongoing networks of informants and foreign nominees. 189 It is this type of 
insider, such as Geoffrey Collier, that attracts wide publicity and diminishes 
public confidence in the integrity of the financial services industry. The cases 
brought so far demonstrate a reluctance to prosecute cases that are not obvious 
violations of the law, and a preference for defendants who plead guilty.'90 
Moreover, these cases represent the difficulty of uncovering the sophisticated 
inside trader without special resources. 191 
The first cases brought also reflect the lack of gravity with which British 
courts may have initially viewed the offense of insider trading. '92 As the DTI 
brought more cases, however, the courts imposed stiffer penalties. Overly nar-
row interpretation in light of the newness of the statute has, however, presented 
a problem. '93 
The first insider trading case, brought in 1981, involved one Bryce, a partner 
of a Scottish investment management firm.l94 Bryce admitted placing an order 
to buy stock in a trust that his firm managed, knowing that the announcement 
of a restructuring of the trust was imminent. 195 Bryce pleaded guilty, but claimed 
189 B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 47. In 1988 the Stock Exchange announced that it had uncovered 
evidence of a ring of over twenty of its members who had been involved in an insider trading scheme 
for a number of years. The Times (London), Mar. 4, 1988, at I, col. 7. The Stock Exchange stated 
that the group had carried out its trades through a string of offshore corporations which Exchange 
inspectors had been unable to penetrate. Id. The Stock Exchange has referred its findings to the DTI. 
With its new investigatory powers under the 1986 Act, the DTI should in theory be able to uncover 
more evidence than the Stock Exchange. Id. 
190 B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 47. Only one case brought under the laws against insider trading has 
been tried before a jury. See infra notes 230-31 and accompanying text. 
191Id. 
192 Tridimas, supra note 187, at 166. 
193 See infra notes 224-31 and accompanying text. 
194 See Rider, Where now after a prosecution and absolute discharge?, 2 COMPANY LAW. 278 (1981) 
[hereinafter Rider II] (citing Lord Advocate v. Bryce, (August 21, 1981) Edinburgh Sheriff Summary 
Court (unreported». See id. Most of the cases brought so far involving insider trading regulations are 
generally unreported. See Huss, Insider Trading Regulations: A Comparison of Judicial and Statutory 
Sanctions, 25 AM. Bus. L.J. 301, 316-21 (1987). 
195 See Rider 1.1. supra note 194, at 278. 
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that he was unaware of the relevant provisions of the Companies Act 1980. In 
addition, he argued that he had made no attempt to conceal his actions, had 
undertaken them on behalf of others, and had taken measures to compensate 
the stock jobber he used to make the trade for the latter's loss in the transaction. 
The court discharged Bryce without imposing any fine or sentence and noted 
that Bryce's efforts to make restitution had influenced this decision. l96 The 
court reached this conclusion in spite of the stated purpose of the law to 
maintain investor confidence by imposing criminal penalties and not to provide 
for restitution or compensation as a defense. 197 In addition, Bryce's employer 
did not consider his actions sufficiently serious to warrant punishment under 
its own in-house code. 19B 
In 1982, the DTI brought a successful case against John Allen Crump Dick-
enson for insider trading. '99 Dickenson was managing director of a subsidiary 
of the Harris and Sheldon Company and knew that another company was 
planning to take over a division of the parent company. Dickenson purchased 
an option contract on stock in the parent using his solicitors as nominees. The 
chairman of Harris and Sheldon learned of the option contract and notified 
the Stock Exchange. The Stock Exchange stopped trading in the stock and 
initiated an investigation. The Department of Trade and Industry brought 
charges against Dickenson, who admitted his action and received a suspended 
sentence but no fine. Dickenson did lose the amount he spent purchasing the 
option as well as his job. This court viewed Dickenson's violation of the law 
more seriously than did the court in the Bryce case.200 
The Department of Trade and Industry brought another successful case in 
1982, which resulted in the convictions of John and Joyce Titheridge, a husband 
and wife team of insiders.20' This case involved the first instance of secondary 
insider trading, that is, by a tippee, and the first case of counseling and pro-
curing another to deal based on privileged information.202 The prosecution 
charged Joyce Titheridge, a secretary at a London merchant bank, with learning 
about a corporate takeover involving her employer, and passing this information 
196 See id. 
197 THE CONDUCT OF COMPANY DIRECTORS, CMND. 7037, supra note ll2, at para. 31 (1977). 
198 See Rider II, supra note 194, at 278. 
199 See Rider, Determined efforts being made to enforce law on insider dealing, 3 COMPANY LAw. 185 (1982) 
[hereinafter Rider III). This unreported case was heard in the Sutton Coldfield Magistrates' Court. 
[d. 
200 See id. 
201 See Rider, The first case of secondary insider dealing, 4 COMPANY LAw. ll7 (1983) [hereinafter Rider 
IV). This unreported case was heard in the Croydon Crown Court, December 17, 1982. [d. 
202 See id. Counseling or procuring another was prohibited by the Companies Act 1980 at § 68(6) 
and reenacted in the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 at § 1(7). Secondary insider 
trading, or acting as a tippee, was prohibited in the Companies Act 1980 at § 68(7) and reenacted in 
the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, supra note 13, at § 1(6). 
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to her husband, who worked for another merchant bank.203 John Titheridge 
bought stock in the takeover target for himself and for a client, resulting in a 
personal profit of over six thousand pounds.204 Joyce Titheridge was charged 
with counseling and procuring another to buy stock based on inside information. 
John Titheridge was charged with acting as a tippee. Both pleaded guilty; the 
judge fined them heavily to deter others and maintain public confidence in the 
financial services industry.205 Both subsequently resigned from their jobs.206 
In 1987, Geoffrey Collier, the stockbroker whose arrest had hastened the 
implementation of the 1986 Act's investigatory powers, was convicted of insider 
trading.207 Collier had bought stock on behalf of Hollis PLC, which was attempt-
ing a takeover of another company, AE. 208 Collier also bought stock in AE for 
himself based on his knowledge of the takeover attempt, placing the purchase 
order through a stockbroker friend in the United States, one Cassell. Cassell 
purchased the stock through a London brokerage before the public announce-
ment of the takeover attempt, and ordered them sold after the announcement, 
which had driven up the price of the stock.209 The stock was purchased in the 
name of a Cayman Islands holding company.2IO These actions attracted the 
attention of Cassell's superiors, who queried him about the transactions.211 
Cassell tried to cancel the transaction, but the London brokerage refused and 
referred the matter to Cassell's superiors. Cassell's superiors questioned him on 
the transaction, and Cassell informed Collier of this. Collier realized he would 
be discovered, and informed the chairman of his own com pany before tendering 
his resignation.212 Collier cooperated with the DTI investigation which fol-
10wed.213 Collier later pleaded guilty, and received a one year suspended sen-
203 Huss, supra note 194, at 318-19. 
204 Rider IV, supra note 201, at 117. 
205 [d. 
206 B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 47. In 1986 Maurice Naerger, a former director of WH Smith, was 
convicted of insider trading. The Times (London), Apr. 29, 1986, at 21, col. 6. Naerger, who pleaded 
guilty, admitted to buying stock in a potential takeover target at the same time that WH Smith began 
considering the target company. [d. While the takeover later fell through, Naerger was able to sell his 
stock at a profit of nearly £3,000. [d. The court in this unreported case fined Naerger £800 plus £100 
in court costs. [d. 
207 The Times (London), July 2, 1987, at I, col. 8. 
208 Lever, "Fall of an Insider," The Times (London), July 2, 1987, at 21, col. 5. While the news 
reports of this unreported case do not specify the exact provisions of the 1985 Act Collier was charged 
with violating, the facts of the case imply that he acted as a tippee in violation of §§ 1(3)-(4) of the 
1985 Act, which prohibits trading on the basis of inside information knowingly obtained from insiders. 
See id. Alternatively, Collier may have been charged with trading in stock on the basis of inside 
information knowingly obtained from an individual making a takeover offer, which is prohibited 
under § I (6) of the 1985 Act. See id. 
209 Lever, supra note 208, at 21. 
210 King and Roell, supra note 6, at 167. 
211 Lever, supra note 208, at 21. 
212 [d. 
213 The Times (London), July 2, 1987, at 20, col. 8. 
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tence and a twenty-five thousand pound fine. 214 In sentencing Collier, the court 
noted the damage he had done to the reputation of the City and hinted that 
future offenders might not be so fortunate as to have their prison sentences 
suspended.215 
In In re an Inquiry under the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985,216 the 
first case interpreting provisions of the 1986 Act relating to the powers of DTI 
inspectors, the Court of Appeal balanced the authority of the investigators 
against the statutory protection of journalistic confidentiality.2I7 This case in-
volved a journalist, Jeremy Warner, who refused to reveal to DTI investigators 
his sources for two articles about the role of a government agency under 
investigation by the DTI for allegedly divulging inside information.218 The court 
ruled that Warner had violated the 1986 Act's prohibition on refusal to comply 
by not identifying his sources.219 The court found that, if DTI investigators 
establish that disclosure of a journalist's confidential sources is necessary for the 
investigation and prevention of a crime, there is no reasonable excuse for 
nondisclosure.22o In order to show necessity, government inspectors must show 
that the information sought is of "substantial assistance"221 to the inspectors, or 
that refusal to disclose will substantially impede the investigation.222 The Court 
of Appeal's decision in this case, and the trend evident in cases brought under 
the Companies Act 1980, are encouraging signs that the courts, as well as the 
government, recognize the need for strong support of the DTI's new investi-
gatory powers to ensure more effective enforcement of the laws on insider 
trading.223 
2. Interpretation Problems Facing the Courts and the Government in Pur-
suing Cases Under the Insider Trading Laws 
Two cases brought under the 1985 Act demonstrate the difficulty of inter-
preting a relatively new statute when there is little precedent to rely upon in 
214Id. at I, col. 8. 
215Id. at 20, col. 8. 
216 In re an Inquiry under the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, [1988] 2 W.L.R. 33 
[hereinafter Warner case]. 
217 See Tridimas, supra note 187, at 164-65. Journalistic confidentiality is protected by the Contempt 
of Court Act, 1981, ch. 49. 
218 See Tridimas, supra note 187, at 162. 
219 See id. 
220 See id. at 164. 
221 Warner case, supra note 216, at 49. 
222 See Tridimas, supra note 187, at 164. 
223 /d. at 166. In 1988, the High Court Chancery Division, following the decision in the Warner case, 
fined Warner £20,000 but declined to impose any prison sentence (which could have been for up to 
two years) because Warner had written his articles in 1985, before the DTI investigatory powers came 
into effect under the 1986 Act. See The Financial Times, Jan. 27, 1988, at I, col. 3. 
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reaching a decision. 224 In an unreported 1985 case, the first in which the accused 
did not plead guilty, the prosecution charged one Kettle, an employee of a 
brokerage house, with buying stock in a company based on unpublished price-
sensitive information received from a client.225 He was also charged with di-
vulging the information to a colleague, the second defendant Thorneywork, 
who bought stock for clients based on that information.226 Thorneywork was 
charged with acting as a tippee. 227 At trial the primary issue was whether the 
defendants knew the information which they used was unpublished and price-
sensitive at the time they acted on it.22B The presiding magistrate held that he 
could not be sure that they did know the information was of this nature at the 
time they acted, as required by law, and he accordingly dismissed all charges.229 
The facts of this unreported case are not complete, and it is therefore not clear 
what standard of knowledge the court applied to the defendants. One could 
argue, however, that stockbrokers should be held capable of recognizing infor-
mation that might be privileged or price-sensitive or of making reasonable 
inquiries into its nature before acting upon it. 
In a 1988 case, a trial court acquitted Brian Fisher after the judge ruled that 
Fisher had not "obtained" unpublished price-sensitive information as required 
by the 1985 Act. 230 In the first insider trading case to come before a jury, Fisher 
was charged with acting as a tippee in buying shares in a company after receiving 
inside information concerning its affairs from the company's merchant bank. 
In acquitting Fisher the judge based his ruling on a dictionary definition of the 
word "obtain," as requiring the active seeking out or procuring of information. 
22-1 Huss, supra note 194, at 320. 
225 Chaikin, Unsuccessful insider trading prosecution, 6 COMPANY LAW. 97, 98 (1985). 
2,6 !d. at 97. Kettle was charged under § 68(7) of the Companies Act 1980, which prohibits individuals 
in possession of inside information to pass on that information to another when he knows, or has 
reason to know, that the other person will use the information in trading stocks. Huss, supra note 194, 
at 321. Section 68(7) of the Companies Act 1980 was reenacted at § I (8) of the Company Securities 
(Insider Dealing) Act 1985. 
227 Chaikin, supra note 225, at 97. 
228 Id. "Unpublished price sensitive information" is described in the 1985 Act as including specific 
malters concerning a company that are not generally known to investors but would, if made public, 
be likely to materially influence the price of that company's securities. Company Securities (Insider 
Dealing) Act 1985, supra note 13, at § 10. 
229 Chaikin, supra note 225, at 97. The Companies Act 1980 required at § 68(3) (reenacted in the 
Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 at § 1(4)) that the accused know the information upon 
which he or she is acting was "unpublished price sensitive information" in relation to those securities. 
230 See The Times (London), May 14, 1988, at 27, col. 3. Sections 1(3)-(4) of the 1985 Act apply to 
an individual who "has information which he knowingly obtained (directly or indirectly) from an 
insider whom he knows or has reasonable cause to believe would not" disclose it by virtue of the 
insider's status as defined in section 1 (1). If the individual who obtains this information knows it to be 
unpublished and price sensitive, that individual may not trade in the stock of the company to which 
it relates, nor trade in the stock of any other company with which the first company has an actual or 
contemplated transaction. Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, supra note 13, at § 1(4). 
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Apparently Fisher received the inside information without any effort on his 
part to gain knowledge of it. The DTI announced that it would appeal the trial 
court ruling to the Court of Appeal to clarify the legal definition of "obtain" in 
the context of the 1985 Act. 23 ! These two cases demonstrate some of the diffi-
culties of interpreting new, untested statutory language. Courts will have to 
eschew narrow definitions and constructions if the law is to be effective against 
insider trading. Over time, as more cases come before the courts, a body of 
interpretation and construction will grow. Until that time, it is uncertain how 
these trial court results will affect future cases. 
B. Detection Capabilities 
The Stock Exchange's detection methods have posed a continuing ob~tacle to 
the investigation of insider trading. The Department of Trade and Industry 
has no market surveillance or detection capabilities of its own and relies instead 
almost entirely on the Stock Exchange to monitor trading activity and detect 
possible cases of insider trading. 232 The DTI also receives complaints and reports 
of suspicious trading activity from jobbers, brokers, investors, and others, as 
does the Stock Exchange. 
Until 1974, the Stock Exchange had no effective means of monitoring stock 
price movements and could monitor only a fraction of the listed securities, and 
even then only with a substantial time lag.233 In 1986, the Stock Exchange 
installed a more sophisticated system for monitoring the market, one which 
tracks price movements and records all trades in a centralized database. 234 The 
time required for determining the details of a particular transaction has 
dropped from six weeks to a matter of hours, and Stock Exchange inspectors 
are now able to examine fifteen trades per day rather than four per week under 
the earlier system.235 The detection and surveillance capabilities of the Stock 
Exchange are approaching those of the New York Stock Exchange and the 
SEC, which maintain extremely sophisticated computer systems. 236 This will 
231 See id. Soon after the acquittal in this case, the prosecution in two pending insider trading cases 
requested temporary delays in the cases. While the DTI denied that the Fisher case was the cause, it 
is possible that the DTI wished to await the results of the appeal in that case to clarify the meaning 
of the word "obtain" under the 1985 Act. The Times (London), May 6, 1988, at 23, cbl. 6. 
232 B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 285. 
233 !d. at 149. 
234 Insider trading in London: The odds move, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 7, 1987, at 74. See also STOCK 
EXCHANGE 1987 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 32, at 3, II. 
235 Insider trading in London: The odds move, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 7, 1987, at 74. 
236Id. The New York Stock Exchange maintains a computerized monitoring entity, called the Stock 
Watch Group. Hawes, supra note 59, at 382. This group monitors trading actiVity and conducts 
investigations into suspicious movements in stock prices which cannot be attributed to market forces. 
Id. at 383. The Stock Watch Group coordinates its activities closely with the SEC and has made use of 
the SEC's subpoena and jurisdictional powers in conducting its oWn internal investigations. !d. at 384-
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allow for more thorough and efficient Stock Exchange investigations, which in 
turn should make DTI investigations more effective. 237 
C. Civil Remedies 
In the United States the existence of civil remedies against insider trading 
has proven an effective means of enforcement.238 These remedies provide eco-
nomic incentives which encourage both companies and individuals to bring 
suits.239 Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act)240 allows 
corporations or shareholders to bring actions against specified insiders who, if 
found liable, must disgorge short term profits to the company in whose shares 
they have traded. 241 In addition, the courts have created implied private rights 
of action for injured investors under section lO(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 
10b-S, a regulation issued under the 1934 Act.242 Under recent legislation, the 
SEC can also recover from insiders up to three times the amount of profits 
gained or losses avoided in an illegal transaction.243 In Great Britain there are 
no comparable civil remedies open to the government, to injured investors, or 
to companies whose shares have been traded by insider traders.244 The govern-
ment has long resisted express civil remedies for insider trading; it has main-
tained that since stocks are traded in a largely anonymous market, civil remedies 
are unworkable since it is impossible to identify the injured party with any 
85. The New York Stock Exchange informs the SEC as to the results of all of its investigations, even 
if it has not uncovered a statutory violation. Id. at 385. 
231 Insider trading in London: The odds move, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 7, 1987, at 74. 
238 Huss, supra note 194, at 302-12. For a fuller description of the civil remedies available against 
insider trading in the United States, see H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK (1987) [here-
inafter BLOOMENTHAL II]. For a description of some recent civil cases brought by the Securities 
Exchange Commission, see H. PITT, INSIDER TRADING: COPING WITH THE USE AND ABUSE OF MARKET 
SENSITIVE INFORMATION (1985), and S. ARKIN, TRADING ON INSIDE INFORMATION (1984). 
239 Durham, The Companies Act 1980: Its Effects on British Corporate Law, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 551, 
579 (1982). 
240 15 U .S.C. § 78(a), et seq. (1982). 
241 15 U.S.c. § 78p(b). 
242 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.IOb-5. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 
(E.O. Pa. 1946). In this case a federal district court implied a private right of action against violators 
of section lO(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Rule IOb-5, which implements it. !d. at 
513-14. Since Kardon, this implied remedy has become an important means of curbing insider trading 
in the United States. H. BLOOMENTHAL II, supra note 238, at § 16.02. 
243 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)(A) (1985). The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-376, 
98th Congo 2d sess. (1984), was enacted in response to what Congress perceived as the need for 
increased deterrence through stronger civil penalties. H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 238, at 418-19. 
Under the Act, the SEC can force an insider trader to disgorge up to three times the amount of profit 
made or loss avoided. Id. In addition, the maximum fine that can be imposed on convicted insider 
traders is raised from $10,000 to $100,000. Id. at 422. 
244 The Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 provides at § 8(3) that no transaction is 
either void or voidable if performed in contravention of the applicable provisions of the Act. See supra 
notes 157-58 and accompanying text. 
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certainty.245 There are likewise no statutory provisions to force disgorgement of 
profits from insider trading activities, and the 1985 Act states expressly that no 
transaction is void or voidable as a result of violations of the law.246 In practice, 
therefore, the insider trader is able to keep his or her profits, even after a 
conviction under the 1985 Act. The Panel on Take-overs and Mergers has, 
through moral suasion, forced violators of its rules against insider trading to 
pay over their profits to charity, but this non-statutory body operates only within 
the relatively narrow area of takeovers.247 
Existing criminal law does not require insider traders to give up their profits, 
and the lack of an alternative set of civil remedies removes a further disincentive 
to violate the law. There are several indirect forms of civil remedies. It is unclear, 
however, how effective these methods are against insider trading, nor is it certain 
that the courts will be receptive to attempts to extend these remedies into this 
area. This section will examine these indirect civil remedies and a new provision 
under the 1986 Act which may hold promise as a tool against insider traders. 
In instances where both parties to a stock transaction are in direct face-to-
face communication, the injured party may be able to obtain recovery from the 
insider in the wake of a criminal conviction.248 Under the Powers of Criminal 
Courts Act 1973, after convicting a person for insider trading, a court may 
order compensation to be paid to the injured party.249 Such an order requires 
a certain determination of the identity of the injured party, since the court may 
not issue a compensation order where the payor's identity is in question.250 This 
limits the widespread use of such orders, as most stock transactions are anon-
ymous. In addition, the use of compensation orders is limited in that they are 
generally a means of enforcing an already existing civil liability.25l A compen-
sation order is therefore designed to obviate the need for additional, civil 
litigation following the criminal proceedings.252 A compensation order may be 
245 THE CONDUCT OF COMPANY DIRECTORS, CMND. 7037, supra note 112, at para. 31. (1977). In this 
White Paper the Government stated that "[ w )here insider dealing takes place in market transactions 
in quoted securities there are substantial problems in linking buyers and sellers which seem to rule 
out civil actions by those who claim to have made losses through buying or selling shares at a critical 
time. Indeed one of the main arguments for creating the criminal offence [sic] of insider dealing is 
precisely that there is usually no effective civil remedy." ld. The White Paper went on to say that 
allowing companies to sue for disgorgement of the insider's profits would bring the company a 
"windfall profit." ld. The White Paper added that the Government had not as yet reached any 
conclusion on whether to provide a means of forcing disgorgement of insiders' profits. /d. As of this 
date there are no such remedies available in Britain. 
246 Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985, supra note 13, at § 8(3). 
247 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
248 B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 43. 
249 Powers of Criminal Courts Act, 1973, ch. 62, § 35. 
250 RIDER I, supra note 6, at 43. 
25l R. v. Chappell, (1985) 80 Cr. App. R. 31, 33. 
252Id. 
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unjustified in most instances, because transactions by insider traders are neither 
void hor voidable under law and there exists no express civil c1aitn.253 Therefore, 
the use of cotnpensation orders will most likely be limited solely to face-to-face 
transactions. 254 
Another related civil remedy involves the violation of directors' fiduciary 
duties. Under the common law, directors have a fiduciary duty to their cotn-
pany.255 As a result of this duty, directors may not derive a "secret profit" by 
virtue of their position.256 In particular, a director may not profit from inside 
information that he or she is obligated to use on behalf of the company and 
not for personal benefit. 257 In equity; a coi.ut can require a fiduciary to pay 
restitution to the cotnpany of those profits the fiduciary earned by breach of 
this duty.258 This duty also extends to officers and employees of the company 
in their capacity as agents. 259 British courts have in the past ordered restitution 
in cases where directors or officers derived personal profit based on their 
knowledge of privileged information.260 These cases did not involve insider 
trading of stock, but instead concerned profits from other aspects of a company's 
business dealings. 261 It is thus not clear that courts will accept an extension of 
this principle to instances of insider trading.262 In addition, this principle may 
be limited to those people having a fiduciary relationship with the company 
whose stock is traded.263 If a fiduciary enables a non-fiduciary to profit by 
disclosing privileged information, it is uncertain that a court could order either 
the fiduciary, who has personally made no profit, or the outsider, who owes no 
duty to the company, to pay restitution. 264 Moreover, a director who trades on 
inside information in the stock of another cotnpany, with which his or her own 
company contemplates some transaction, owes no duty to that company and 
could not be ordered to pay restitution. 265 While some commentators have 
suggested that it may be possible to obtain restitution by arguing that corporate 
"property" in the form of information has been misappropriated, it is uncertain 
that courts would view inside information as corporate property.266 
253 Id. 
254 B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 43-44. 
255 Id. at 69. 
256 GORE-BROWNE ON COMPANIES, supra note 134, at § 12.21.1. 
2571d. 
258 See, e.g., Bray v. Ford, (1896) C.A. 44; Boardman v. Phipps, [1967] 2 A.C. 46. 
259 B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 83. 
260 See, e.g., Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gulliver, [1942] I All E.R. 378; Industrial Development Con-
sultants Ltd. v. Cooley, [1972] 2 All E.R. 162. 
2bIld. 
262 B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 7 I. 
263 GORE-BROWNE ON COMPANIES, supra note 134, at § 12.21.2. 
264Id. 
265Id. 
266/d. 
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The 1986 Act provides a potential means for obtaining restitution orders 
against insider traders. Section 61 of the 1986 Act provides for restitution orders 
to be issued by courts for violations of the rules of the SIB or any of the self-
regulating organizations or other bodies it authorizes.267 The Securities and 
Investment Board or the Department of Trade and Industry may make a 
request to the court on behalf of investors to issue a restitution order against 
an insider trader. 268 This insider trader must have violated the rules of the SIB, 
a recognized investment exchange, such as the Stock Exchange, or a self-
regulating organization, such as the Securities Association, which includes the 
Stock Exchange.269 The court may order the insider, on the basis of such a 
violation, to pay the profits that the court determines were derived from the 
prohibited transactions.27o The court can then order that these sums be paid to 
those persons whom the court determines entered into transactions with the 
insider.271 If utilized in this way, this provision may prove an effective means of 
obtaining civil relief.272 The provision is new, however, and the mechanics of 
issuing a request to the court for an order, as well as the means for determining 
who is entitled to receive compensation, remain to be worked OUt.273 For ex-
ample, it is not clear whether a person who believes he or she has traded with 
an insider who had the benefit of privileged information can initiate proceedings 
by making a request to the SIB or the DTI to apply for a restitution order. Nor 
is it clear what criteria these agencies will require before they agree to make an 
application. Finally, as in the case of compensation orders, which require certain 
identification of the injured party, it is uncertain how the courts will undertake 
to make such an identification for purposes of applying this provision. 
Section 62 of the 1986 Act allows persons who suffer a loss as the result of 
any violation of regulations made pursuant to the Act to sue the violators in a 
civil action.274 Hence, if a firm or individual subject to SIB rules and regulations 
violates those rules, whoever suffers a loss as a result has a right of action for 
267 B. RIDER, D. CHAIKIN AND C. ABRAMS, supra note 8, at ~ 734. 
268 Financial Services Act 1986, supra note 9, at § 61. Rule 5.21 of the SIB Conduct of Business Rules 
of the Rules and Regulations provides that a firm shall use its "best endeavours" to ensure that none 
of its officers or employees deals in stock in violation of the 1985 Act. SECURITIES AND INVESTMENTS 
BOARD, RULES AND REGULATIONS Conduct of Business Rules (1987). This rule also prohibits the firm 
from effecting a transaction prohibited under the 1985 Act for its own benefit, subject to certain 
limited exceptions. [d. The rules also require an investment firm to establish arrangements whereby 
sensitive information is compartmentalized within departments and kept from the trading personnel. 
[d. at Rule 5.20. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. These are presumably the types of violations 
that could give rise to a right of action under § 62 or a restitution order under § 61 of the 1986 Act. 
269 Financial Services Act 1986, supra note 9, at § 61. 
270 [d. at § 61(5)-(6). 
271 [d. at § 61(6). 
272 See generally B. RIDER, D. CHAIKIN AND C. ABRAMS, supra note 8, at ~ 734. 
273 [d. 
274 Financial Services Act 1986, supra note 9, at § 62. 
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breach of statutory duty.275 This right of action also arises where a member of 
a self-regulating organization or recognized investment exchange, such as the 
Stock Exchange, violates that body's existing rules, or rules that could have been 
made concerning a given matter within its purview.276 Hence, it may now be 
possible for an investor who suffers a loss to bring a civil suit for a violation of 
either SIB or Stock Exchange rules prohibiting insider trading, even where the 
government has not brought a criminal action. The SIB's enactment of section 
62 of the 1986 Act in its Rules and Regulations has come under strong criticism 
and opposition from the financial services industry and securities firms' law-
yers. 277 The industry fears a rash of lawsuits arising from any and every breach 
of the SIB's lengthy and complicated rules.278 The investment industry and its 
lawyers have therefore insisted on precise rules, which detail every obligation 
of the industry and its members.279 This has delayed both the implementation 
of a revised set of SIB rules and the use of section 62 of the 1986 Act as a 
weapon against insider traders.28o 
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND OUTLOOK 
Since 1980, the enforcement record of the Department of Trade and Industry 
has been good, but not remarkable; of the ten cases brought to trial, seven have 
resulted in convictions.281 It is not apparent, however, whether the DTI has 
done all that it can to enforce insider trading laws, or whether it is possible at 
this time to enforce the law more effectively. The new investigatory powers 
enacted under the Financial Services Act 1986 will help improve this record. 
In order to use such powers effectively, DTI inspectors must have an adequate 
commitment of will and resources from their superiors.282 Such commitment 
was not apparent prior to the enactment of the 1986 Act.283 It is too early to 
tell how effectively the DTI will be able to exploit its new investigatory powers.284 
It is likewise too early to predict how useful the newly updated detection 
capabilities of the Stock Exchange will be in uncovering the more sophisticated 
insider traders operating in the City.285 Finally, it may prove necessary to provide 
275 !d. at § 62(1). 
276 !d. at § 62(2). 
277 British investors' bill of rights, THE ECONOMIST, Apr. 30, 1988, at 80. 
278 Can the SIB survive 1992?, THE ECONOMIST, July 16, 1988, at 71,72. 
279Id. 
280 !d. 
281 See supra note 185. 
282 B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 286-87. 
283 Tridimas, supra note 187, at 168. 
284 See supra notes 159-83 and accompanying text. 
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meaningful civil remedies as an additional means of enforcement and deter-
rence.286 
This section will first assess the effectiveness of the DTI's enforcement record 
since 1980.287 Second, this section will assess the future prospects for enforce-
ment given DTI investigators' new powers and the enhanced detection capa-
bilities of the Stock Exchange. 288 Third, the section will examine the quality of 
liaison between the Stock Exchange and the DTJ.289 Finally, this section will 
discuss the need for effective civil remedies as an enforcement tool and as a 
deterrent to potential insider traders.29o 
A. Past and Future Enforcement 
Since 1980, the DTI has investigated over one hundred potential violations 
that the Stock Exchange has referred to it291 and brought ten prosecutions and 
obtained seven convictions.292 In the United States during the same period the 
Securities and Exchange Commission has brought over one hundred successful 
prosecutions.293 The relative paucity of cases in Britain might be due to the 
newness of the statutory prohibitions on insider trading. It may take time to 
develop adequate internal administrative expertise and mechanisms for inves-
tigation and enforcement within an agency. It appears that until only quite 
recently the DTI has not committed itself to vigorous enforcement and has not 
made available the resources of money and personnel necessary to conduct 
thorough investigations.294 Until 1986, the government refused to acknowledge 
the need for specialized investigatory capabilities and relied on part-time, out-
side appointees to conduct inquiries.295 In addition, the government had origi-
nally viewed the prohibitions on insider. trading as more in the nature of a 
deterrent than as a law to actively enforce.296 Indeed, the few cases brought 
since 1980, most of which involved easily detected instances of small scale 
opportunists who pleaded guilty, may have represented more than just inade-
quate resources and investigatory authority. These cases may well have been 
intended more as merely an occasional reminder to potential insider traders 
that they, too, could be prosecuted: deterrence by way of example. In other 
286 See supra notes 238-80 and accompanying text. 
287 See infra notes 291-97 and accompanying text. 
288 See infra notes 298-304 and accompanying text. 
289 See infra notes 305-10 and accompanying text. 
290 See infra notes 311-17 and accompanying text. 
291 Insider trading in London: The odds move, THE ECONOMIST. Feb. 7, 1987, at 76. 
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293 Insider trading in London: The odds move, THE ECONOMIST. Feb. 7, 1987, at 76. 
294 See B. RIDER 1, supra note 6, at 286-87. 
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words, the cases may not have represented a strong commitment to a compre-
hensive, ongoing enforcement of the law.297 
The lack of effective means to conduct a thorough investigation and produce 
sufficient evidence to bring a prosecution has been another obstacle to enforce-
ment. 298 The use of outside investigators has been an obstacle to the develop-
ment of institutional expertise in this area. In addition, inspectors had insuffi-
cient power to uncover all but the most blatant cases of insider trading; more 
sophisticated violators, using foreign nominees to shield their identity, were able 
to remain undetected.299 The new powers accorded DTI inspectors under the 
1986 Act will enable them to conduct more thorough, efficient, and successful 
investigations.30o Both the government and the courts are apparently willing to 
support the investigators' new powers, as the Warner case in 1987 indicates. 30l 
In addition, the Secretary of State for Trade has indicated a willingness to use 
DTI civil servants rather than outside appointees as inspectors, which will help 
the Department develop institutional expertise in conducting investigations and 
eventually improve the DTI's success rate. 302 The recent Memoranda of Un-
derstanding completed with the United States, Japan, and Switzerland will also 
help DTI inspectors to uncover insider traders who use overseas corporations 
and agents. 303 
The much improved surveillance and detection capabilities of the Stock Ex-
change will also be of great assistance, both to the Exchange's own investigators 
who conduct preliminary inquiries and to DTI investigators. Investigators can 
now reconstruct the details of a given transaction within hours rather than days 
or weeks, which helps make investigations more thorough and efficient.304 This 
may enable Stock Exchange investigators to uncover more data than in the past, 
which will make both their investigations and those of DTI inspectors more 
thorough and effective. 
B. Public-Private Liaison 
While the DTI's new powers of investigation and the Stock Exchange's en-
hanced surveillance capabilities each augur well for future enforcement, a po-
297 See supra notes 189-91 and accompanying text. 
298 See supra notes 159-83 and accompanying text. 
299 See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text. 
300 See supra notes 159-83 and accompanying text. 
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ten.Id. 
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tentially troublesome problem of liaison remams. Since 1980, the Stock Ex-
change has agreed to refer suspected cases of insider trading td the DTI, and 
indeed has referred over one hundred cases.305 But the nature of the liaison 
between the Stock Exchange, a private, self-regulatory (albeit statutorily rec-
ognized) body, and the DTI is not clear.306 It is not cleat how the Stock Exchange 
decides that a given investigation either is not a potential violation of the law 
and should be dropped or that it is and should be referred to the DTI. Thus, 
Stock Exchange investigators may, given their more limited powers of investi-
gation, be unable even to uncover enough information during their initial 
inquiry to determine whether there is sufficient likelihood of an insider trading 
violation to refer the matter to the DTI for further investigation.307 To the 
extent the DTI depends on the Stock Exchange with its limited investigatory 
authority, cases could remain undetected and might be lost for want of power 
to obtain the necessary evidence at an early stage.30B To ensure against this, a 
higher degree of cooperation may be necessary between the DTI and the Stock 
Exchange, perhaps modeled on the coordination between the Securities and 
Exch<\nge Commission's investigators and the major U.S. exchanges.30g Short of 
this, the DTI might attempt to devise some means of monitoring the progress 
of Stock Exchange investigations; or of requiring the Stock Exchange to notify 
the DTI when the Stock Exchange initiates an inquiry, rather than after it has 
finished its investigation and refers the matter to the DTI. It may be possible 
to institute a more formal relationship without unduly incre<\sing governmeht 
regulation of or interference with the Stock Exchange.310 
C. The Need for Effective Civil Remedies 
The lack of effective civil or private remedies in Great Britain against insider 
trading presents another obstacle to enforcement and deterrence. The use of 
civil remedies specifically intended to combat securities fraud has proven an 
effective deterrent and penalty in the United States.311 In Great Britain, on the 
305 Goltidison. supra note 66, at 23. col. 2. 
306 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
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other hand, the government has opposed express civil remedies against insider 
trading as unworkable in practice.312 In addition, the common law civil remedies 
which do exist are not well suited and do not apply specifically to insider trading. 
Hence, it is uncertain whether the courts will be receptive to attempts to adapt 
the available common law remedies to insider trading cases.313 The fact that 
Parliament expressly intended no civil remedies for violating the prohibitions 
against insider trading may act to restrain the courts from issuing compensation 
orders or restitution orders.314 
To improve enforcement, it may become necessary for the government to 
introduce express civil remedies against insider trading. Section 61 of the 1986 
Act, which allows the SIB or the DTI to apply for restitution orders, is a potential 
remedy, but it is not specifically aimed at insider trading.315 Section 62, which 
allows a civil right of action for violation of SIB or Stock Exchange rules, has 
encountered resistance and may not be implemented in an effective form for 
some time. 316 The government may find it useful to introduce some form of 
civil action whereby either the DTI, the SIB, or the company whose shares were 
traded by the insider might bring an action to recover the insider's profits. A 
civil remedy open specifically to individual investors with whom an insider trader 
has dealt in the Stock Exchange is less likely to be enacted, given the govern-
ment's expressed misgivings about the ability to identify such individuals.317 The 
government may find, however, that some form of civil liability aimed at insider 
traders could be an effective means of punishment and deterrence. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The regulation of insider trading in Great Britain was for many years solely 
the province of the private, self-regulating bodies involved in the financial 
services industry. Even after the imposition of criminal penalties in 1980, it 
remains a mix of self-regulation and statutory oversight. The self-regulatory 
bodies, including the Stock Exchange, have a continuing interest in curbing this 
practice: the continued level of autonomy of the financial services sector is 
highly dependent on public confidence in its integrity and its ability to maintain 
fair and efficient markets. The Stock Exchange has an important role to play 
in the detection and investigation of insider trading, a role not established by 
statute but a necessary one given the reluctance of the government to play a 
larger regulatory role. The more sophisticated surveillance capabilities that the 
31' See supra notes 159-61 and accompanying text. 
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314Id. at § 12.32. 
315 See supra notes 267-73 and accompanying text. 
316 See supra notes 274-80 and accompanying text. 
317 See B. RIDER I, supra note 6, at 44. 
1989] INSIDER TRADING 299 
Stock Exchange has recently installed should enable it to play its part more 
effectively in the future. 
The criminal prohibitions against insider trading are designed to prevent the 
abuse of inside information. Prior to the Financial Services Act 1986, however, 
the government was not able to enforce these prohibitions effectively, and the 
law was in danger of coming into disrepute. The new powers given DTI inves-
tigators under the 1986 Act should lead to more effective investigation and 
enforcement, if the DTI is willing to commit itself to this end. It is important 
that the DTI also build up in-house expertise in this area, rather than rely as it 
has until now on part-time outside inspectors. Events occurring since the im-
plementation of the 1986 Act indicate that the DTI is gradually building the 
commitment and expertise necessary for vigorous enforcement. 
If the DTI is serious about enforcing insider trading violations, however, it 
must work to achieve a high lewl of coordination with the Stock Exchange, on 
which it relies completely to monitor trading and perform preliminary investi-
gations. There is a danger that potential violations will be lost at this stage, 
violations which the DTI with its greater authority could successfully investigate. 
As in the United States, the Stock Exchange may be willing to draw on the 
powers of the statutory authorities in conducting its investigations. In addition, 
the use of civil remedies aimed at insider traders' profits could be a useful tool 
of enforcement and deterrence. While their effectiveness is subject to some 
criticism, the civil remedies available in the United States could provide a model 
for Britain. 
Given the relatively recent history of government involvement in the regu-
lation of insider trading in Britain, it appears that the record of detection and 
enforcement will continue to improve. To ensure this, however, the Department 
of Trade and Industry must make an active commitment to enforcement and 
improve its working relationship with the Stock Exchange. This, along with 
meaningful civil remedies aimed at insider trading, will make for an effective 
enforcement regime. 
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